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# Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism

- 1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4,
  DCID 4/6 (approved by the IAC on October 30, 1956) established a
  list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the
  coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to
  requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national
  security policy.
- 2. In order to establish a list of priority national intelligence objectives in the field of international Communism, the IAC Committee on International Communism has derived the following intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.
- 3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical factors relating to international Communism requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between two levels of priority within the general priority category.
- 4. The relevant DCID 4/6 objective is quoted first, followed by an indented outline listing of the national intelligence requirements for collection and production of intelligence material.

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#### I. First Priority Objectives\*

- a. "Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or satellite armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I.a.)
  - International Communist movement activities
     indicating Soviet intentions with regard to hostilities.
  - 2. Soviet plans for the use of the international

    Communist movement particularly in war or preparation for war.
- b. "Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I.b.)
  - International Communist movement and Chinese
     Communist Party activities indicating Chinese
     Communist intentions with regard to hostilities.
  - 2. Chinese Communist plans for the use of the Asian

    Communist movement particularly in war or

    preparation for war.

<sup>\*</sup>First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate, and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would occasion greatest benefit to the US.

- c. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key U.S. overseas installations and for defense against air (including missiles) attack." (DCID 4/6, I.c.)
  - Communist Party and international Communist
    movement capabilities and plans to facilitate
    Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or key
    US overseas installations through sabotage.
- d. "Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations." (DCID 4/6, I.d.)
  - 1. International Communist movement activities indicating Soviet plans and intentions for the clandestine
    delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
    against the US or key US overseas installations.
  - Soviet plans to use the international Communist
    movement in the clandestine delivery of unconventional weapons against the US or key US overseas
    installations.

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#### II. Second Priority Objectives\*

- a. "Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet Bloc, to weaken and disrupt US and US-supported alliances, or to foment antagonism among the Western powers and between these powers and the rest of the free world." (DCID 4/6, II.b.)
  - International Communist movement activities, especially clandestine, including changes in "line" or
    organization, and shifts in emphasis among target
    groups which might reveal Soviet objectives and
    policies with regard to:
    - (a) Attracting non-Bloc countries;
    - (b) Weakening and disrupting US and US-supported alliances;
    - (c) Fomenting antagonism among the Western powers;
    - (d) Promoting antagonism between the Western powers and the rest of the world.

<sup>\*</sup>Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

- b. "Soviet (including Satellite) political strengths and weaknesses; the actual locus of power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling groups; Soviet-Satellite relations with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations." (DCID 4/6, II.c.)
  - 1. Conflicts within the Satellite Communist parties.
  - Friction between the Soviet Communist Party and those of the Satellites.
  - 3. Soviet control of the Satellite Communist parties.
  - 4. Influence and control of the local Communist party within each Satellite.
  - 5. Effect of Soviet Bloc friction on the international Communist movement.
- c. "Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between the Western and Asian powers and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia." (DCID 4/6, II.h.)
  - International Communist movement and Chinese Communist Party activities indicating Chinese Communist:
    - (a) International policies;
    - (b) Efforts to divide the Western and Asian powers;

- (c) Plans to extend Communism in Asia;
- (d) Party relations with the overseas Chinese.
- d. "Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, actual or potential strains on the relationship, and the process of arriving at and coordinating joint policies." (DCID 4/6, II.j.)
  - 1. Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and that of the USSR.
  - Relations of the Chinese Communist Party with Yugoslavia and Satellite parties.
  - 3. Effects of Sino-Soviet relations on the international Communist movement.
- e. "The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China." (DCID 4/6, II.i.)
  - Strength, aims, organizations, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Chinese Communist Party.
  - Personal or policy conflicts within the Chinese Communist
     Party.
  - 3. Chinese Communist capabilities to support and influence the international Communist movement.

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- f. "Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts and capabilities to direct espionage against the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign areas, and against non-Bloc countries." (DCID 4/6, II.x.)
  - Communist party and international Communist
    movement espionage and sabotage activities,
    organization, capabilities, plans, techniques,
    and targets.
  - 2. Communist espionage, infiltration and sabotage against the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign areas and against non-Bloc governments, armed forces and military installations.
- g. "The stability and policies of the Middle East Arab states," Iran with particular reference to oil concessions and installations, other commitments to the West and the Suez situations; the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities; and vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda and subversion, and Bloc political and economic inducements." (DCID 4/6, II. q.)

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 Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Communist movement in the Middle East Arab states, \* Iran and Israel.

Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the principalities and colonial or semicolonial areas on the Arabian Peninsula littoral."

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 Plans, policies and capabilities of the Communist movement to infiltrate, influence, control, or undermine the governments and ruling groups of these states.



- i. "The stability and orientation of India, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic development." (DCID 4/6, II.p.)
  - Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Indian Communist movement.

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2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Indian Communist movement to influence India's policies and especially Indian relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.



k. "The military, political, and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, its political and military
objectives and intentions, Chinese Communist military and political
intentions with respect thereto, and the relative degree of Soviet and
Chinese Communist influence, control, and economic activity in
North Korea." (DCID 4/6, II.m.)

- Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the North Korean Communist Party.
- Chinese Communist Party relations with the North Korean
   Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
- 3. Soviet Communist Party relations with the North Korean Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
- 4. The relative influence of the Soviet and Chinese Communist

  Parties in North Korea.
- 5. North Korean Communist plans and capabilities for clandestine activity in South Korea and Japan, including infiltration of their military establishments.
- 1. "The political and economic strengths and weaknesses and the general military capabilities, of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, its political and military objectives and intentions, and its capabilities and intentions for clandestine and subversive activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." (DCID 4/6, II.n.)
  - Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Viet Minh Communist Party.
  - 2. Relations between the Viet Minh Communist Party and the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and with the international Communist movement.

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3. Viet Minh Communist plans and capabilities for clandestine activity in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, including infiltration of their military establishments.

m. "The stability of US base rights overseas; factors affecting the security of US military bases and installations in foreign areas." (DCID 4/6, II. v.)

- 1. International Communist movement actions and policies affecting US base rights abroad; especially Communist capabilities and efforts to influence public and official opinion adversely to US possession of base rights; Communist capabilities, plans and efforts to penetrate and sabotage US military bases.
- n. "Franco-German relations; France's will and ability to fulfill its NATO commitments; French policy toward North Africa particularly with respect to nationalist unrest in the area and Communist connections therewith." (DCID 4/6, II.s.)
  - 1. French Communist will and ability to obstruct fulfillment of French NATO commitments.
  - 2. Communist relations with North African nationalist unrest and capabilities for affecting it.
  - French Communist aims and influence regarding French policy toward North Africa.

- o. "The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive and clandestine), vulnerabilities and tactics of Communist parties and groups outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the international role of the Yugoslav Communist party and the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and Italy." (DCID 4/6, II. w.)
  - 1. Strength, aims, organization, composition, internal condition, interrelationship, appeal, propaganda, and political, subversive and clandestine capabilities, vulnerabilities and tactics of non-Bloc Communist parties and groups everywhere and international Communist front organizations.
  - Yugoslav Communist Party relations with the international Communist movement, the Socialist parties and the Socialist International, its role in the evolution of Communist ideology.
  - 3. Channels of communication used by the international Communist movement and among Communist parties, including that of the USSR; Communist finances; machinery and techniques for policy and action coordination; plans, intentions, ideological developments and evolution; relations with the Socialists, extremist parties and with trade union organizations.